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ABSTRACT 
The economics and finance literature on mortgage lending is unclear with respect to the degree, if any, of discrimination against poor 
women, and much other social science literature (sociology and geography), feminist and otherwise, argues that economic conditions 
and gender go hand in hand. This paper augments a virtually non-existent literature on how Canadian mortgage lenders behave in 
practice, reporting on an experiment run in British Columbia to see whether local mortgage lenders made loans based on the income 
guidelines of CMHC or if they stereotyped poor women as bad risks. 
RESUME 
La litterature sur I'economie et sur la finance des prets hypothecaires n'est pas claire en ce qui concerne le degre, s'il y en a, de 
discrimination contre les femmes pauvres, et d'autre litterature de science humaine (sociologie, geographie) feministe et autre, soutient 
que les conditions economiques et le sexe vont de pair. Cet article augmente une litterature presque non-existante sur la conduite des 
institutions canadiennes de prets hypothecaires, rapportant une experience faite en Colombie- Britannique pour voir si le institutions 
de prets hypothecaires locales faisaient des prets selon les lignes directrices d'apres le revenu de la SHLC ou si elles stereotypaient les 
femmes pauvres en tant que mauvais risques. 
INTRODUCTION 
"The poor useth intreaties; but the rich 
answereth roughly." Proverbs 18:23 
Financial institutions engaged in housing 
credit lending are generally assumed to be seeking 
maximum profits.1 Given this goal, and absent 
transaction costs or a taste for discrimination, it 
would generally not make economic sense to 
discriminate against any group of potential 
borrowers. The reasoning is that, even if relatively 
poorer, they are still potential suppliers of funds -
and given good credit histories - attractive users of 
funds. Despite these beliefs about financial firms, 
rumours and tales of unfair treatment suffered by 
various individuals at the hands of their mortgage 
lenders persist. Many of these stories are about 
banks treating women rather less well than white 
males, and poorer people (perhaps especially those 
on social assistance) badly when compared to 
richer ones. Does the data and literature suggest we 
should be concerned about these stories in Canada, 
or are they merely examples of urban legend? 
In the summer of 1996, a small research 
grant enabled us to hire two students to help 
directly test whether or not there was any truth to 
the anecdotal evidence. Based on such anecdotes 
and on the literature reviewed in some detail below, 
it was our belief that local financial institutions, if 
approached by a middle class white male seeking 
mortgage pre-approval, would pre-arrange a 
mortgage for at least as much money as would be 
indicated by the Canadian Mortgage and Home 
Corporation (CMHC) guidelines. In contrast, we 
expected that local lenders would stereotype a 
single welfare mother and offer to lend her less 
than C M H C guidelines would indicate. We 
believed, in other words, that our local mortgage 
lenders would discriminate against her because of 
her gender, her poverty and perhaps particularly, 
her use of social assistance.2 
This paper first reviews the literature on 
discrimination in mortgage lending, beginning with 
the feminist housing literature and that found in 
geography and sociology, followed by the recent 
North American economics and finance literature. 
Then our methodology and results are described. 
Finally our abiding concerns about current lending 
practices in small-city Canada are reported. 
THE GEOGRAPHY, SOCIOLOGY AND 
FEMINIST HOUSING LITERATURE 
Urban geographers point out that 
mortgage lenders are likely to stereotype properties 
by "red lining," so called because the lenders draw 
red lines around neighbourhoods perceived as "bad 
risks" (Knox 1995). Mortgages are refused to 
applicants wishing to live in these neighbourhoods. 
This practice diminishes property values and 
increases neighbourhood deterioration, thus 
indirectly discriminating against individuals who 
currently live there as well as those who want to 
buy homes within such parts of the city (Knox 
1995). In part because of laws banning this practice 
(Knox 1995), mortgage lenders are extremely 
reluctant to admit to red-lining policies, but the 
practice continues. While especially common in 
England and the United States, red lining does 
occur in Canada (Bourne and Bunting 1993). 
Because our areas of urban poverty are less 
concentrated and visible than either the United 
States or Great Britain (Ley 1991), the practice is 
thought not to be as extensive. Single mothers, 
visible minorities, immigrants and students suffer 
the consequences since they tend to be localized in 
bad risk areas (Knox 1995). 
The geography literature also suggests that 
mortgage lenders make judgements about 
applicants based on "social conventionality" as well 
as "financial caution" (Knox 1995, 140). As in the 
literature on mortgage lending practices, the 
evidence is spotty. Many early studies from the 
1960s and 1970s do not consider gender as an 
explanatory variable, not entirely surprising as 
fewer women applied for mortgages during this 
period. The studies that report bias are typically 
based on interviews with mortgage lenders who 
displayed certain discriminatory notions and 
attitudes, particularly toward class and race. 
Unfortunately, none of these studies are Canadian. 
A study by Sylvia Novae (1996) was based on 
interviews with women living in major immigrant-
receiving cities and focussed on the needs of 
immigrant and minority women. It would, however, 
be difficult to argue a general bias toward class in 
Canada when home ownership among blue-collar 
workers has been consistently higher than among 
the middle-class (Harris and Pratt 1993). 
With the rise in the numbers of female-
headed households and in the numbers of women 
earning high incomes, one would expect an 
increase in the number of women applying for 
mortgages. The Canadian government reports that 
"the likelihood of women owning their homes 
depends, in large part, on their family status. In 
1994, for example, 79 per cent of women in two-
spouse families lived in an owner-occupied home, 
whereas only 48 per cent of unattached female 
seniors, 33 per cent of unattached women aged 15-
64, and 31 per cent of female lone parent families 
owned their homes" (Government of Canada 1998). 
Single mothers comprise one group of 
borrowers whom lenders may regard as financially 
unattractive. The feminist literature on housing 
shows that regardless of which wealthy Western 
country you look at - Canada, Britain, Australia or 
the United States - lone-parent families, most of 
whom are led by women, are less likely than other 
family types to own homes, being more likely to 
rent, share accommodation, or suffer overcrowding 
in their living situation. As well, they spend a 
disproportionate amount of their income on shelter 
(Winchester 1996; Harris and Pratt 1993). 
The literature also suggests a growing 
polarization is occurring between financially secure 
professional women and those women below the 
poverty line, namely single mothers and elderly 
women living alone. Only 20 percent of Canadian 
women have full-time, full-year jobs which pay 
more than $30,000 per year, compared to 40 
percent of men (Canadian Labour Congress 1997). 
THE ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
LITERATURE 
Because Europeans use vastly different 
methods of housing finance, particularly for the 
poor, the finance literature we considered was 
primarily North American. During the presidency 
of John Kennedy and later with Lyndon Johnson's 
"Great Society," the US began a legislative 
emphasis on equality of opportunity. By the Carter 
administration, governmental intervention moved 
from laws aimed at voting rights to those directed 
at access to good housing and therefore to the 
financial system for all Americans, regardless of 
race and (later) gender. At the time of the passage 
of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (1974), such 
topics as the provision of mortgage credit were 
common in the US economics literature. 
In general, economist researchers use 
quantitative rather than qualitative data. By the end 
of the 1970s, due in no small part to the Community 
Reinvestment Act (1977) and later with the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and 
Enforcement Act (1989), these researchers in the 
US gained access to a wealth of data. This data 
structured the character of modern economics and 
finance literature in a way that cannot be matched 
in the Canadian literature as our researchers lack 
access to the most minimal data about those who 
apply for mortgages. 
A vital source of recent US discussion has 
been the "Boston Data set" lending information 
collected by the Boston Federal Reserve. A study 
based on this data (Munnell et al. 1992) seemed to 
provide clear evidence that, in spite of the laws 
passed during the Johnson and Carter presidencies, 
lending discrimination continued. Because of the 
tendency on the part of mainstream economists to 
assume that markets should, at least over time, 
clear, such results were at best disconcerting. 
These results were suspect, however, because the 
data set was extraordinarily dirty. 
A survey article by Calomiris, Kahn and 
Longhofer (1994) attempted to reconcile these 
results with free market economic theory. They 
examined and analysed governmental intervention 
in the mortgage markets, considered the evidence 
of such discrimination, then modelled and 
described the expected consequences of several 
alternative explanations for such apparent 
discrimination. These explanations included a taste 
for discrimination on the part of lending officers; 
"rational discrimination" resulting from costly 
information gathering;3 the closely related cultural 
affinity model; and, finally, moral hazard. 
Relying on a cleaned version of the much 
maligned Boston Fed data set and using only data 
from conventional loans, Hunter and Walker (1995) 
tested the cultural affinity model. Perhaps because 
their sample size was fairly small, there was no 
clear evidence of gender discrimination. 
Importantly, they did find some evidence that such 
characteristics as poor credit histories, high 
obligation ratios, and "bad neighbourhood" effects 
mattered and that they mattered far more in 
combination with minority status. 
One interpretation of these results is that 
when "objective" measures of credit worthiness are 
negative, lending officers (as agents) can indulge 
their taste for discrimination with minimum risk of 
being caught. A second interpretation is that when 
the objective evidence, including obligation ratios, 
is negative and information about potential 
borrowers is costly, "statistical" discrimination is 
rational because information costs about applicants 
differ. Hunter and Walker felt most comfortable 
with the latter interpretation of the facts of the 
Boston data set. 
A simple lack of cultural affinity, 
however, suffers some weakness as a long term 
explanation for such behaviour. From the 
perspective of a shareholder, the cultural affinity 
explanation represents an agency problem. Imagine 
that while a given loan officer lacks cultural affinity 
with, for example, a welfare mother, s/he is 
sufficiently comfortable with higher income 
applicants to be able to tell which of them will pay 
back loans. This loan officer would generally make 
loans to the "good" high income applicants, but to 
few, if any, applicants on social assistance because 
obtaining information about them is costly. Surely, 
however, there are other loan officers, who at some 
time had been on social assistance, for whom this 
cultural gap would not exist. While those loan 
officers might in turn lack cultural affinity with 
wealthier applicants, it seems less likely (since they 
are now in that group). By hiring an employee who 
had received social assistance in the past, ceteris 
paribus, these financial institutions would be able 
to attract all of the good (that is those who will 
repay) borrowers who are poor or on social 
assistance who would be overlooked by other 
banks, and make increased profits for the firm's 
owners. A failure to recruit such officers itself 
represents either shortsighted or discriminatory 
behaviour on the part of the bank management, and 
can persist only if owners do not become aware of 
the lost opportunities for profits. 
In the years since the publication and 
dissemination of these papers, there have been 
several attempts to clean the data and/or alter the 
statistical methodology to gain a clearer insight into 
what this data set really shows. Most recently, 
Harrison (1998), who adjusted the statistical 
methods, and Day and Liebowitz (1998), who 
found the cleaned data still suspect, concluded that 
they contained little evidence of systematic 
discrimination in mortgage lending based solely on 
race or gender. Both papers emphasized that the 
actual issue was probably better described as banks 
refusing to lend to individuals who have weak 
economic characteristics.4 
Weak economic characteristics include, 
for example, a poor credit condition (a "bad 
bureau") or a high obligation ratio. A poor credit 
condition may have been the result of being young 
and financially innocent. A high obligation ratio 
means the individual is spending a very large 
fraction of his or her income on housing. While one 
might be willing and able to maintain that 
behaviour for a few years, postponing the acquisi-
tion of capital goods and running down current 
assets, it is more difficult to do over a thirty-year 
period. However, the relevant issue to the lender is 
not only current income, but also expected income. 
As well as to historic dead-beats, traditional 
financial institutions might want to refuse lending 
to those currently poor who are expected to remain 
poor. Such individuals cannot reasonably be 
expected to maintain these relatively high payments 
for the duration of the mortgage, and obviously 
lack the ability to shorten the payment period by 
paying larger than required payment amounts. 
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINT 
If one is willing to engage in stereotyping, 
the expected income of a given white, single 
mother, particularly one who is receiving social 
assistance, will be lower than that of a given white 
male. For a lender, poverty over the lifetime of a 
mortgage is risky if it results in a high obligation 
ratio, even in the face of a good credit history. One 
might not be comfortable that someone with a low 
income (and therefore a low expected income) 
would be able to continue making monthly 
mortgage payments. However, such an applicant 
might not be able to cover the unexpected - but not 
uncommon - expenses associated with owning a 
home. The lender will therefore decline such an 
applicant. The difficulty, then, is that while 
stereotyping is, of course, a form of discrimination, 
it may well be actuarially sound. 
The difficulty in practice is that because 
economic characteristics correlate tightly with 
gender-absent specific information about the future 
income prospects of a given loan applicant, a 
refusal to lend based on economic characteristics, 
while rational, risk-adjusted behaviour, may well be 
de facto discrimination. One regulatory alternative 
would be a prohibition of the use of economic 
characteristics as a basis for refusing lending. 
However, the results of that cure are probably far 
worse than the disease. Still, governments typically 
do choose to reduce this risk, in spite of Mr. 
Harrison's and others' "second best" advice. In 
Canada, the C M H C and its insuring of mortgages 
have accomplished this end. By guaranteeing the 
mortgage of anyone falling within CMHC's 
standards and practices, the mortgage lender does 
not suffer default risk. When a financial institution 
refuses a mortgage C M H C would have approved, 
absent of any other information about the 
applicant's future income potential, this too would 
seem de facto discriminatory. But unlike the US, in 
Canada there is no equivalent of the C R A or 
FIRREA, nor are there counterpart watchdog 
agencies to the Office of the Controller of Currency 
(OCC) and of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), gathering and interpreting the data 
necessary to monitor lender performance. 
METHODOLOGY 
To search for evidence of discriminatory 
stereotyping, an experiment was devised and 
conducted during the summer of 1996. In 
particular, the questions posed by the experiment 
were, first, did lenders actually follow C M H C 
lending guidelines, and, second, did they lend 
based on a best estimate of future earning. Being 
financially constrained by the size of our grant, we 
maximized the chances of finding stereotypic 
discrimination by comparing the ways local lenders 
in a small city in western Canada responded to a 
young, married white male and a divorced, single 
parent welfare mother. 
Following the methodology used by HUD, 
and O C C , 5 paired testers were sent into the 
mortgage market to see if financial institutions 
treated them differently or similarly to one another. 
To test for the expected discrimination, two 
business degree students entering fourth year were 
hired.6 We had initially planned to use imaginary 
credit data, alternating the income status of the 
male and female tester, so that half of the time each 
of the testers would be the higher income 
individual. However, the regional credit bureaus 
declined to cooperate with this process,7 so the 
choice was made to have both members of the team 
tell the truth about their circumstances. Thus all 
lenders faced a financially better off white male and 
a poorer white mother on social assistance. The 
first of these students, D, was a white male whose 
wife worked at a fairly low-paying, but permanent, 
full-time job. D worked, when possible, to 
supplement the family income. In total, they earned 
about $36,500 per year, slightly above the median 
family income in British Columbia. D, who was 
studying accounting, told the lender that he and his 
wife were considering buying a house in the spring, 
as soon as he found an articling position. They 
hoped to be able to take advantage of a good buy, 
but to do so they needed to know ahead of time 
how much mortgage they could obtain. He was a 
lender's dream student, already middle class and 
moving up. 
The second student, J, was on social 
assistance and a single parent of a daughter. Like 
D, J was studying accounting, but she was also 
interested in art (especially oil painting). She 
earned income by modelling for the university fine 
arts classes. She was clearly "different" from the 
average small town banker. However, she should 
have been seen as facing good future income 
prospects, based on her high marks, once she 
obtained her accounting degree. 
Table 1, found in the appendix, shows the 
relationship between the family unit size and the 
amount of money that a welfare recipient would 
receive in direct support and shelter allowance from 
social assistance in British Columbia. The 
highlighted row shows that such a family unit 
receives $383 support allowance and up to $520 
shelter allowance. Shelter allowance can be used 
for rent or mortgage payment (both interest and 
principal), taxes, and regular maintenance. 
Individuals were allowed to keep $200 a month of 
any earnings. (This rule has changed since the data 
was gathered. Single parents may now keep 25% of 
any earnings.) 
In addition, such a family receives other 
government support including subsidized day care, 
free medical care, a free bus pass, drug coverage, 
etc. Before they can go onto social assistance the 
family must draw down its assets. However, they 
may retain up to $5500 in savings. 
As well, in British Columbia, a family unit 
may exclude from the assets that must be drawn 
down "the family home, partially or wholly owned 
and lived in by a recipient" or "moneys received or 
to be received from a mortgage on, or agreement 
for sale of the recipient's previous home used as his 
or her ordinary residence, provided such moneys 
are applied to the amount owing on a home being 
purchased by that recipient and occupied as his or 
her ordinary residence, or provided such moneys 
are used by that recipient for the payment of rent 
for accommodation occupies as his or her ordinary 
residence" (Guaranteed Available Income for Need 
Regulation 8(3 )(d) and 8(3 )(f)). While the poor in 
BC can still keep their houses and go on social 
assistance, this is not true in all provinces. For 
example, as one of the reviewers pointed out, it is 
not true in Ontario (where, of course, the head 
offices of several of our mortgage lenders are 
located). 
J owned a condo and was considering 
selling it and buying a small house. Following the 
provisions of the social assistance act, she should 
be able to extract her equity, about $30,000, and 
use it as a down payment on a house, with social 
assistance paying the mortgage holder the monthly 
principle, interest, and taxes, up to the maximum of 
the shelter allowance. This was what J proposed 
when she spoke to the lenders. A l l mortgage 
lenders in the city - over two dozen banks, trust 
companies, credit unions, and mortgage companies 
- were approached by J as well as by D. 
The highlighted row in Table 2, again in 
the appendix, shows the relative size of J's shelter 
allowance to her living allowance. If this were used 
to determine J's borrowing, her obligation ratio 
would be about 58%, slightly better than the 
percentage used by Hunter and Walker for their bad 
obligation ratio statistic. The total living allowance 
excludes a rather large day care subsidy, free bus 
transportation, free medical care and subsidized 
drug coverage, so 58% percent overstates the actual 
obligation ratio. As well, unlike the sample group 
in the Hunter and Walker case, and unlike the case 
of the working poor, a borrower on social 
assistance has housing funds supplied by the 
government which can be paid directly to the 
lender. Thus the lender incurs default risk only if 
and when the recipient succeeds in getting off 
social assistance. Because we dealt with a mortgage 
pre-approval, and because of the nature of the 
community, there was no real equivalent of the 
Hunter and Walker "bad neighbourhood." Finally, 
both of the individuals in the experiment had a 
good credit rating. 
In Canada, the C M H C , like the FHA in the 
US, restricts the obligation ratio acceptable for a 
guaranteed loan. Specifically, C M H C loans require 
a maximum gross debt service ratio (i.e., principle, 
interest, taxes, heat, plus one-half of any strata or 
condominium fee compared to income before 
taxes) of 32%, slightly lower than the median 
obligation ratio of Hunter and Walker. While 
Canadian mortgage lenders typically credit ration, 
rather than price discriminate, some institutions 
charge higher rates than others. Thus a loan 
applicant turned down by a bank might be able to 
find funds, but only elsewhere and at a higher rate. 
How did we expect our two students would be 
treated? 
WHAT WAS ANTICIPATED? 
Using current C M H C guidelines and 
appropriate longer term mortgage rates,8 Tables 3-
6 in the appendix show the maximum house prices 
J could, in principle, afford under four different 
assumptions. Table 3 considers the case where she 
sought a conventional loan, which requires 25% 
down, and was allowed to use her total living 
allowance as if it were earned income. Because 
C M H C rules restrict the borrower to using 32% of 
this income for housing, principal, interest and 
taxes (pit), J had $289 = .32 x $903 to spend on 
monthly payments. Yearly taxes were estimated at 
$ 13.7496 per $ 1000 of house value, insurance costs 
at $2.5533 per $1000 of house value and yearly 
hydro/gas at $4.28 per $1000 of house value. Tax 
estimates were based on the town's average tax 
rates, supplied by the city assessor's office. Heating 
cost was estimated based on the relationship 
between its typical price per square foot and the 
relation between size and house price. Finally, 
insurance was estimated using the "rebuild cost 
guide" for insurance. We were able to calculate that 
J ought to be able to borrow $27,207 for a 
mortgage, as shown in the highlighted row. 
Making the same assumptions about taxes, 
hydro/gas and insurance, Table 4 calculates the 
amount J could borrow if she were applying for a 
low down payment loan. In this case, the amount 
was $32,978. 
If C M H C were to allow J to use the full 
amount of her shelter allowance on housing, 
principle, interest, taxes and gas/hydro, as would be 
the case for her current condo, her allowable 
spending would be higher. Since welfare recipients 
in British Columbia only receive the shelter 
allowance if they are spending it, C M H C might 
allow her to use this sum: Tables 5 and 6 replicate 
tables 3 and 4 using the higher shelter allowance. In 
these cases, depending on the type of loan chosen, 
she could borrow up to $58,856 as a mortgage and 
still meet C M H C guidelines. 
Because J had more than the minimum 
down payment, the maximum house she could 
afford would be higher than that listed in the 
column "most expensive house" on Tables 3- 5 for 
two person family units. To find J's maximum 
affordable house, we added her equity of $30,000 
to the amount of mortgage she could receive for 
each of the four loans C M H C might approve. 
Based on discussions with CMHC's, we 
learned their guidelines are quite straightforward: 
1. Individuals obtain C M H C loans via 
financial institutions based on their income. 
2. For individuals on social assistance and if 
it appears that they have been on such assistance 
for some time (12 months was the time span 
mentioned by several offices) and are likely to 
continue on assistance for some time (as in the case 
of a single parent of young children), that 
assistance counts as income. 
3. Any extra amount by which the shelter 
allowance might exceed the allowable payments 
will be forfeit by the welfare recipient. 
Our town, K, has approximately 85,000 
people. Clearly, if financial institutions choose to 
use C M H C guidelines to make these mortgages, the 
available choice set is artificially restricted.9 Our 
expectation was that the financial institutions would 
limit loans to the C M H C standard, restricting J to 
using her welfare cheque as income, corresponding 
to the highlighted sums of money in Figure 1, 
below. 
Using the same assumptions about tax 
levels, insurance, and hydro/gas cost and the same 
costs for borrowed money, D's expected maximum 
mortgages were calculated, once again using the 
32% rule. Depending on whether a conventional or 
a low down-payment financing would be sought, 
the expected value of D's mortgage ranged from 
$92,830 to $109,744. 
Finally, for comparison purposes, a row 
has been added for a hypothetical full-time, 
minimum wage employee. Making the same 
assumptions as for J and D, the results show that in 
the bottom row clarifies why the C M H C guidelines 
use income rather than the shelter allowance as a 
lending base. (See Figure 1) 
WHAT WE FOUND 
D, our male tester, was offered a range of 
mortgages differing from one another because of 
the various assumptions about heating, tax and 
insurance. They ranged from $99,845 to $116,550, 
rather more generous than in our estimates, but 
reasonable if the financial institutions erred on the 
side of generosity in their estimates of the non-
mortgage housing expenses. 
The same generosity was not evident when 
local lenders dealt with J. Not a single bank, trust 
company, or other mortgage lender would agree to 
lend her anything, unless she had a co-signer upon 
whose income the financial institution's decisions 
would be made. While calls to the home office 
assured us this was not company policy, this might 
be a local "policy." We suspect that the location of 
headquarters of several of the financial institutions 
in Ontario, a province where a person must sell his 
or her home before being granted social assistance, 
may mean that very few people in this group would 
have the funds needed for a down payment, 
reducing the likelihood that they would apply for a 
mortgage and diminishing the banks' overall 
familiarity with, and perhaps sensitivity to, these 
issues. 
What else might explain this behaviour? 
It could be some other form of risk aversion is 
operating. One possible concern suggested by two 
ex-bankers was that the financial institutions would 
not wish to see their names in the headlines when 
this woman's house needed a roof she could not 
afford, and they were forced to foreclose. A second 
concern implied by an anonymous referee's 
comments was that other poor applicants (and some 
wealthier ones as well) might well see it to be very 
unfair for people to see individuals having their 
mortgage paid out of taxpayer dollars. Thus banks 
that lent to welfare recipients might well, at best, 
annoy some customers and, at worst, be targets for 
consumer boycotts. 
While a federal body (CMHC) takes a 
given position, it will clearly not apply in provinces 
forcing sale of houses as "liquid" assets. Further, 
the positions of financial institutions are not clear. 
Even if one were to agree that the C M H C stance is 
"correct," and in cases like those in British 
Columbia where federal and provincial policy 
coincide, it does not follow that financial 
institutions have an obligation to make mortgage 
loans in such cases. 
What is especially worrisome to us is that 
J had no options left to her. Regardless of whether 
she was refused because she was poor or because 
she was on social assistance, she was stereotyped. 
She was poor (on social assistance), and it was 
assumed she would remain poor (on social 
assistance). No lender asked her about future 
income or future plans. Both test subjects had 
informed the lenders that they were students, but 
none of the lenders sought information about 
whether J's future course of study would likely lead 
to a job, so that any long term concerns flowing 
from poverty (being on social assistance) could be 
diminished. Regardless, local institutions not only 
violated government policy and their headquarters' 
stated policy, but, in fact, acted in a way that 
apparently violated the bank's long-term profit-
maximizing goals. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The economics and finance literature on 
mortgage lending is unclear with respect to the 
degree, if any, of discrimination against poor 
women. Much other social science literature 
(sociology and geography), feminist and otherwise, 
argues that economic conditions and race or gender 
go hand in hand. Perhaps because most economists 
separate gender from economic characteristics, the 
most recent literature argues that financial 
institutions act rationally, refusing to lend to people 
with poor economic conditions, without regard to 
gender. 
An experiment was run to see whether or 
not lenders in a small city in British Columbia 
offered loans based on the income guidelines of 
C M H C . Further, this experiment sought to clarify 
whether, given information about current income, 
lenders stereotyped individuals or sought 
information about any likely changes in future 
income. The results were that not only did lenders 
stereotype, they refused to offer loans that were 
within C M H C guidelines, thus violating federal and 
provincial government policy, as well as stated 
financial institution policy. 
One might hope that the outcomes 
observed in the limited experiment are atypical, but 
one suspects they are not. This case has some 
concerning implications. Because she was on 
welfare, J's mortgage payments could be paid to the 
financial institution directly, drastically reducing 
default risk. While a minimum wage job would pay 
slightly more than being on social assistance, the 
risk the financial institutions take is that i f J is 
forced off pogey, she will not make her payments. 
Clearly, one might have expected the financial 
institutions to change their beliefs had they known 
she was in the process of completing her 
accounting degree. But unlike the famous 
investment advisors in the television ad, they did 
not ask: they simply provided their own rough 
answer. 
Because financial limitations restricted our 
study methodology, we would like to extend our 
work to see if this response differs with more trials 
and when the poor person (or person on social 
assistance) is male. As well, we would like to 
contrast the working poor with those on social 
assistance. For now, this will have to wait for 
further research. 
ENDNOTES 
1. By this economists mean the maximization of the stream of net revenues over the expected life of a given business. Net benefits 
are benefits minus costs. When appropriate, benefits include non-monetary returns as the joy one gets by working for one's self. Costs 
include, when appropriate, non-monetary costs as the unpaid labour supplied by family members. 
2. This distinction was brought to our attention by an anonymous referee. 
3. In this case, the term "costly data" or "costly information gathering" refers to the fact that in order to obtain facts about a potential 
borrower's likelihood of repaying, the lender's loan officer will have to spend extra time and effort determining if there is additional 
information to gather that, if gathered, would enable the lender to make a better decision about this applicant. Unless mandated by 
government regulation, the additional cost of figuring out what questions to ask, what information to seek, then spending time asking 
those questions and obtaining that information may exceed the lender's benefit from so doing. 
4. Oddly, although Harrison concludes that gender is not statistically significant, its sign is negative, suggesting refusals were less 
common, controlling for other influences, if one were female. This seems odd, since many women, especially single mothers, 
presumably ought to find themselves in the data group having "weaker" economic characteristics. Odder still is that marital status has 
a positive sign, suggesting an increased likelihood of being turned down for a loan if married. Harrison's analysis has several other 
odd signs, but of course, nothing is statistically significant, leaving the reader to ponder the issue, shake her head and conclude, 
perhaps, that nothing really happens in lending that is very much out of the reasonable and ordinary. Harrison's position is that while 
there may be discrimination in the labour markets, resulting, although unfairly, in weaker economic characteristics for some women, 
it would be inappropriate, using second best policy constraints, for society to attempt to fix labour market problems via the mortgage 
markets. 
5. In this case, HUD and OCC are hoping to determine iflenders are in compliance with their legislated and stated goals. To do this, 
a deception study is used. Two individuals, one acting as a control and other representing the target of possible discriminatory 
practices, are sent in to "apply" for a mortgage in order to test the way in which the lender actually treats them. 
6. To determine which of the characteristics - gender, poverty and/or the use of welfare - matters to lenders or if it is only the 
combination of these, it would have been ideal to hire six students, three women (one on social assistance, one poor but not on social 
assistance and one not poor) and three men (with a similar set of financial statistics). Unfortunately, the level of financial support for 
the project only allowed two students. 
7. Since the students were seeking pre-approved mortgages, it was anticipated that at least some of the financial institutions would 
verify the students' credit records. Interestingly enough, that never happened. 
8. Unlike the US where thirty year, fixed-rate mortgages are still common, the longest term commonly available in Canada is five 
years. (It is possible to obtain mortgages for up to ten years, but they are uncommon and the rate differential is high.) 
9. Unlike their US counterparts, Canadian financial institutions rarely sell off their mortgages. There is, therefore, less need to 
standardize to CMHC guidelines. 
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Figure 1: Expected Mortgage Approval 
Person 
Conventional 
Loan based on 
Income 
Low Down-pay. 
Loan based on 
Income 
Conventional loan, 
based on Shelter 
Allow. 
Low Down-pay 
loan based on 
Shelter Allow. 
J- max mortgages 
max house $ 
_ _$27,208 
$57,208 $62,978 
$48557 
$78557 
$58856 
$88856 
D-jnax mortgage $_ 
D- max house $ 
_ _$92,830 
$123,770 
$109,744 
$121,937 
min wage-max mort $ $35,612 S36.674 
APPENDIX- T A B L E S 
Table 1 
Guaranteed Available Income For Need Regulations- Schedule J (Current Through December 1995) 
Unit Size 
1 
Maximum Support Allowance 
$221 
Maximum Shelter Allowance 
$325 
Total Living Allowance* 
$546 
? 
3 $486 $610 $1096 
4 $589 $650 $1239 
5 $692 $700 $1392 
6 $795 $730 $1525 
7 $898 $760 $1648 
8 $1001 $780 $1781 
9 $1104 $800 $1904 
10 $1207 $820 $2027 
Table 2 
Obligation Ratio Using A 90% Shelter Allowance 
Unit Size 
1 
Total Living Allowance* 
$546 
Obligation Ratio (Shelter/Total) 
.60 
$903 .58 
3 $1096 .56 
4 $1239 .52 
5 $1392 .53 
6 $1525 .48 
7 $1648 .46 
8 $1781 .44 
9 $1904 .42 
10 $2027 .40 
* excludes day care, medical, transit and other subsidies 
Table 3: 
Conventional Mortgage and House Price Maximums,i=.()8, n=300 Payments, Income-based 
People In 
Unit 
1 
Max Support 
$ 
221 
Max Shelter $ 
325 
Available 
Conventional 
Mortgage S 
16330.61 
Down-Payment 
Needed 
4082.65 
Most Expensive 
House 
20413.27 
U 
Avail. 
2 
2 ,;s3 52c 27207.53 6801,88 .MOW 42 14 
3 486 610 33087.77 8271.94 41359.72 20 
4 589 650 37444.64 9361.16 46805.80 21 
5 692 700 42106.17 10526.54 52632.72 22 
6 795 730 46158.36 11539.59 57697.95 22 
7 898 760 50210.55 12552.64 62763.18 25 
8 1001 780 53958.06 13489.51 67447.57 29 
9 1104 800 57705.57 14426.39 72131.96 29 
10 1207 820 61453.08 15363.27 76816.35 34 
Assumptions: yearly taxes = $13.7496/$ 1000 of house value; yearly insurance = S2.5533/S1000 and yearly hydro/gas = $4.28/$1000 
Table 4: 
Low Down Payment Mortgage and House Price Maximums,i=.08, n=300 Payments, Income-Based 
People In 
Unit 
1 
Max Support $ 
221 
Max Shelter $ 
325 
Low Income 
Mortgage $ 
19794.19 
Down + 
Mortgage Ins. 
2474.27 
Most Expensive 
House 
21773.61 
U 
Avail. 
3 
2 ^2'i 32'>-X iM 4122 2* ^275X1 11 
3 486 610 40105.39 5013.17 44115.93 20 
4 589 650 45386.30 5673.29 49924.93 20 
5 692 700 51036.51 6379.56 56140.16 22 
6 795 730 55948.13 6993.52 61542.94 22 
7 898 760 60859.75 7607.47 66945.72 28 
8 1001 780 65402.07 8175.26 71942.28 30 
9 1104 800 69944.39 8743.05 76938.83 34 
10 1207 820 74486.72 9310.84 81935.39 40 
Table 5: 
Conventional Mortgage And House Price Maximums,i=.08, n=300 Payments, Shelter Allowance 
People In 
Unit 
1 
Max Shelter $ 
325 
Available 
Conventional 
Mortgage $ 
29,991.51 
Down-Payment 
Needed 
7,497.88 
Most Expensive 
House 
37,489.39 
U Units 
Available 
20 
2 520 48,557.68 12.139.42 f.0,69-.l() 22 
3 610 57,126.68 14,281.67 72,408.35 29 
4 650 60,935.13 15,233.78 76,168.91 34 
5 700 65,695.69 16,243.92 82,119.61 40 
6 730 68,552.02 17,138.00 85,690.02 51 
7 760 71,408.35 17,852.09 89,260.02 54 
8 780 73,312.58 18,328.14 91,640.72 57 
9 800 75,216.80 18,804.20 94,021.00 62 
10 820 77,121.02 19,280.26 96,401.28 64 
Table 6: 
Low Down Payment Mortgage and House Price Maximums,i=.08, n=300 Payments, Shelter Allowance Based 
People In 
Unit 
1 
Max Shelter $ 
325 
Max Mortgage $ 
36352.43 
Down + Ins Needed 
4544.05 
Most Expensive House 
39987.68 
# Units 
Available 
20 
1 520 58X56 U 7*57.04 64741.96 28 
3 610 69242.73 8655.34 76167.01 34 
4 650 73858.92 9232.36 81244.81 39 
5 700 79629.14 9953.64 87592.06 50 
6 730 83091.28 10386.41 91400.41 58 
7 760 86553.42 10819.18 95208.76 63 
8 780 88861.51 11107.69 97747.66 68 
9 800 91169.60 11396.20 100286.56 74 
10 820 93477.69 11684.71 102825.46 75 
